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Capital Gains Tax: Significance of Changes in
Holding Period and Long Term Rate
HaroldM. Somers*
The author studies the economic implications of changes in the
structure of the capital gains tax. He shows how this tax creates a
"lock-ir" effect, which reduces the liquidity of the market and impairs
economic growth, and he concludes that the proposed reduction of
the long-term rate and lengthening of the holding period will only have
further detrimental effect on the market.

The capital gains tax. in this country has been subject to a number
of changes in holding period and long-term rate. Once again, revisions are under consideration. The Administration's tax proposals of
1963 contemplate a change in the holding period from six months
to one year and a change in the long-term rate from 50 per cent of
the ordinary income bracket, with a maximum tax rate of 25 per
cent, to a simple inclusion of 30 per cent of long-term gains. With
the proposed reduction in ordinary income brackets from a range
of 20-91 per cent to a range of 14-65 per cent, the long-term rate
would change effectively from the current range of 10-25 per cent to a
range of 4.2-19.5 per cent.'
The present article is concerned with the economic significance of
changes in holding period and long-term rate. The President's proposals are used for illustrative purposes only. The same basic analysis
may be used in evaluating other specific proposals, such as the use of
lower rates for holdings between six months and three years.
I.

IMPACT ON

AvALABrry OF CAPrrAL

In order to understand the current provisions and the proposed
changes, we must consider the philosophy behind the differential
treatment of longer-term gains. It is recognized that there is a
significant distinction between current income and capital gains and
that true capital gains, if they can be distinguished clearly, should be
* Chairman, Department of Economics, University of California, Los Angeles.
The author received valuable suggestions from Alice John Vandermeulen and J. Fred
Weston who should not be held responsible for the defects of this paper.
1. H.R. Doe. No. 43, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. (1963); President's 1963 Tax Message,

Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1,
at 23-24 (1963).
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subjected to a lower rate than current income. In some countries,
the capital gains, once they are segregated, are left tax-free. In
others, some tax is imposed, partly out of a concern for the difficulty
of segregating true capital gains and partly out of a recognition of
the fact that the gains do provide spendable income and should be
subject to taxation. One rationalization of the differential treatment
of longer-term gains is the assumption that longer-term holdings are
somehow desirable for the economy, hence that the government
should encourage longer-term holdings through lower rates. Is this
a valid assumption? In particular, is it a valid assumption in the case
of securities?
Here we must distinguish between the physical investment-the
purchase of plant, equipment and inventories-and the financial instruments that facilitate such physical investment. The physical investment itself may involve a commitment of many months or years.
Does this mean that the purchaser of the financial instruments should
be encouraged by the government to hold on to the securities for
months or years? In other words, should the government intervene
in the securities market to encourage holders of securities to hold on
to their securities longer than they might otherwise? There may be
reasons why the government wishes to use tax policy (e.g., through
depreciation rates and investment credit) to encourage long-term
physical investment; it does not automatically follow from this that
the government should use tax policy to encourage longer-term holding of the underlying securities.
Pursuing this point further, let us distinguish between the "physicalinvestor" who actually purchases the plant, equipment or inventories
and the "financial-investor" who provides the funds. We must also
distinguish between the "initial' financial-investor, who provides
funds to the physical-investor (hence, buys the new securities) and
the "subsequent" financial-investor, who buys second-hand securities.
The initial financial-investor may purchase stocks, bonds, notes,
"open account' or, if he is also the physical-investor, may simply
finance himself.
Depreciation preferences and investment credits are directed toward the physical-investor and are designed to induce him to make
more physical investments of a particular duration or character. If,
for the moment, we identify physical investment with economic
growth, we might say that such tax concessions tend to promote ecomic growth.
What if the government decides that such inducements operating
on the physical investor are not enough? It may decide to induce
the financial-investor to make funds more readily or more cheaply
available to the physical-investor. The obvious way would be to
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reduce or remove any tax penalty associated with making funds
available to the physical-investor. The taxation of capital gains is
such a penalty and a reduced rate or shorter holding period tends to
reduce the penalty. As a general proposition we may say that the
lower the rate or the shorter the holding period the less the penalty,
hence the greater the inducement to provide funds to the physicalinvestor, hence promote economic growth.
It is in this way that a lower tax rate on capital gains-whether on
all gains or only long-term gains-tends to promote economic growth.
In case the tax structure distinguishes between short-term and longterm gains and taxes the latter at a lower rate, a reduction in holding
period will likewise tend to promote economic growth. Since we rely
primarily on the free market to provide the funds to finance economic
growth, it behooves us to increase the effectiveness of that market in
providing those funds. Tax inducements to provide funds for investment through lower rates and shorter holding periods cannot be
overlooked in that context.
A.

AT

PoINT

OF INITLAL INVESTMENT

The fact that financial and physical investment must be distinguished should not blind us to the fact that the one can have a
profound impact on the other. It is true that, "The purchase of a
security and the purchase of a capital good should be distinguished.
In the former case, the investment decision from the social point of
view has already been made and financial resources committed."2
This fact does not make it a matter of indifference to us that tax
policy tends to lock in the initial financial investment and slow down
subsequent exchanges of second-hand securities. The prospective
lock-in discourages new investors from entering the field and retards
the transfer of financial resources among investors. The mobility of
capital is impaired, the freedom to move in response to incentive
(other than tax) is hampered and the liquidity of the market is reduced.
Assume that the old physical investment is now less desirable
socially than some prospective new investment. It would be good
policy to permit the cost of replacement-and expansion-financing
in the less desirable physical area to rise relative to the cost of new
financing in the more desirable area. The sale of existing securities in
the old investment and the supplying of funds for the new investment
tends to accomplish this. Anything that prevents this "transfer" continues to keep prices of the old securiti6s uneconomically high and
2. Richman, Reconsideration of the Capital Gains Tax-A Comment, 14 NAT'L TAX
J1.402, 403 (1961).
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the prices of the new securities uneconomically low (with reverse
effects on the costs of financing, respectively), thus encouraging the
continued pouring of replacement and additional funds into the
uneconomic activity and discouraging the financing of the socially
more desirable investment.
The tax effect on security prices depends on the relative impact of
the tax provisions on demand and supply, a point which has been
developed elsewhere.3 The assumption is that, at times when paper
gains predominate, supply is restricted more than demand, hence the
prices of old securities are higher than they would otherwise be.
Since the suppliers of new securities have no paper gains they are not
affected directly by the tax. Prospective demanders of new securities
are, however, repressed in two ways: (1) by the prospect of a capital
gains tax (in roughly the same way as demanders of the old
securities); (2) by the fact that some of the prospective demanders
may have their money tied up in the old securities. The result is that
the prices of the new securities are lower than they would be in the
absence of the tax. This means that the cost of new financing is made
greater by the tax.
The fact that the initial physical investment decision has been made
and funds committed is thus not the end of the story. Improvements
in the allocation of resources are made by failure to add to or replace the less desirable investment. This is accomplished partly by
the financial markets insofar as they make financing more and more
costly to the less socially desirable areas. Any interference with the
mobility of capital interferes with this allocative effect of the financial
markets.4
What would be the effect of lengthening the holding period? The
longer holding period (rates constant) would make the securities less
attractive to the initial financial-investor, hence hurt the physicalinvestor by making financing more expensive. Thus lengthening the
holding period in and of itself would discourage physical investment
and retard economic growth. On the other hand, a lowering of the
long-term tax rates would tend to make the securities more attractive,
hence make funds more readily and more cheaply available to the
physical-investor.
The above discussion is in terms of the impact on the physicalinvestor by way of the direct and immediate impact on the initial
financial investor. The direct and immediate impact is in the form of
a penalty tax on sale, which makes the securities less attractive than
they would otherwise be. This is separate from the subsequent
"lock-in effect," which says that in order to avoid, postpone, or reduce
3. Somers, Reconsideration of the Capital Gains Tax, 13 NAT'L Tx J. 289 (1960).
4. For further discussion of the relation between the two see id. at 300.
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the penalty, the holder of securities will postpone the sale. We are
here at the point of initial sale of the securities. The prospect of any
tax, and a fortiori a penalty tax on early sale, raises the cost of capital
to the physical-investor, hence tends to discourage physical investment and retard economic growth.

B.

THRouGH SUBSEQUENT LocK-iN

Any subsequent lock-in that occurs will have an indirect effect on
the physical-investor, also of a detrimental sort. The previous discussion was in terms of prices of old securities relative to the prices of new
securities at any time. The lock-in effect makes prices of the old
higher when they are already high and lower when they are
already low. 5 Since new and old securities are constantly in competition with each other for funds, prices of new securities will tend to
go with old (subject to the tax-induced differential indicated above).
Thus the physical-investor will tend to gain from the price consequences of the lock-in effect when prices are already high and he
will tend to lose from the lock-in effect when prices are already low.
In other words, the lock-in effect will tend to encourage physical investment in stock-market boom periods and discourage it in stockmarket depression periods. Since there is known to be a high positive
correlation, with appropriate lead-lag adjustments, between stockmarket prices and business activity, the lock-in effect tends to aggravate over-investment and under-investment, hence is destabilizing
in a physical-investment sense as well as in a financial-investment
sense.
The key to this part of the analysis, of course, lies in the question
whether there really is a lock-in effect and whether its potency would
be affected by a lengthening of the holding period and reduction in
long-term rate. These matters are discussed in the following parts of
this paper.
It is important to emphasize that the lock-in effect is not a function
merely of the holding period and differential rate. There would be a
lock-in effect and a barrier to the free flow of capital even if the tax
on capital gains were uniform regardless of the length of time the
asset was held. The reason is that there is an advantage in postponing the tax as long as possible to avoid the capital-reduction involved in paying the tax. A reduction in rates after a certain period
(such as six months, at present) merely increases, does not create, the
incentive to be locked-in. Whether or not a particular individual will
5. Ibid. There is strong statistical evidence that realized capital gains tax revenues
are destabilizing cyclically. See Lmws, FEDERAL FISCAL POLICY IN THE PosTWAR RECESSIONS 49-50 (1962).
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stay locked-in with a particular security will, of course, depend on

the strength of the factors inducing him to sell. No one has ever
claimed that everyone with a paper gain will refuse to sell. It is all
a matter of the strength of the conflicting influences. Somie will find
it expedient to hurdle the capital gains tax barrier while others will
find it expedient to huddle behind it.

C.

LIQUIDITY, MOBILITY
VOLUME OF TRANSACTIONS

INTERRELATION OF

AND

A strong economic argument can be made in favor of a large
volume of transactions. The greater the volume of transactions, the
less the relative impact of any particular sale or purchase, In a
seldom-traded security-one in which the volume of transactions
is low-there is a great risk of a wide gap between two successive
prices. A prospective seller may suffer a considerable price
risk if he places his stock on the market "at the market." A prospective purchaser of such a seldom-traded security will likewise be discouraged from buying that security. Thus economically worthwhile
ventures may have a hard time finding financing-i.e., may find
financing extraordinarily costly-if a thin market exists or is in prospect. Anything that increases the volume of transactions in a security
(other than panic) improves the prospects or lowers the cost of the
new financing; anything that decreases the volume of transactions
discourages the new financing.
The "liquidity of the market" may be considered either synonymous
with, or a unique function of, the volume of transactions. Anything
that increases the liquidity of the market encourages the mobility of
capital. The liquidity ensures a ready market when a sale is to be
made, and a price that will generally be determinable within narrow
limits at that time. A new issue has a better chance of a favorable
reception if the prospect is that there will be a liquid market for that
issue-a large volume of transactions-which will establish a prevailing price at any time and ensure a smooth price flow, not wide gaps
from one transaction to another. The free flow of capital from one
security to another, from one industry to another, is facilitated by the
ease of purchase and sale, hence by the liquidity of the market (the
volume of transactions). The basic premise is that mobility of capital
is to be encouraged as a means of ensuring the best allocation of
economic resources. By the same token, the liquidity of the market is
to be encouraged. In this way a large volume of transactions tends to
encourage the optimum allocation of resources.
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CAPITAL GAINS TAX
COMMENTS ON ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF EXISTING PROVISIONS

The possible consequences of the proposed changes may be evaluated against a background of the effects of the existing provisions.
A theoretical analysis by the present writer, mentioned above, has
suggested that the prevailing tax reduces liquidity of the capital
markets, promotes cyclical instability by accentuating fluctuations in
security prices, and retards economic growth.6 Theoretical analysis
will have to be relied on until we have adequate statistical investigations, such as the comprehensive simulation study proposed by
7
Steger.
The existing provisions are, in summary: ordinary income tax rates
on gains on holdings of six months or less; tax at one-half regular rates
but not more than 25 per cent on holdings longer than six months;
loss offsets against gains; for individuals, loss offsets against income up
to $1000 per year; a five-year carryover of unused losses.
Earlier disagreements on the effects of the tax, including the defense of the tax by Walter Heller and others, are considered in the
above articles and the references cited therein. Recent criticism of
the theoretical analysis is considered below. It is noteworthy that the
President in his tax message says:
The present tax treatment of capital gains and losses is both inequitable
and a barrier to economic growth ....

The tax on capital gains directly

affects investment decisions, the mobility and flow of risk capital from
static to more dynamic situations, the ease or difficulty experienced by
new ventures in obtaining capital, and thereby the strength and potential
for growth of the economy. The provisions for taxation of capital gains are

in need of essential changes designed to facilitate the attainment of our
economic objectives.8
A. MEANING OF THE TERM "CAPrrAL GAINS TAx"

A terminological confusion occasionally arises in using the expression, "capital gains tax." The term is used by the present writer to
refer to any taxation of gains, whether those gains are short-term or
long-term. In other words, we are referring to those items included
in Schedule D, the form provided especially for reporting capital
gains, both short-term and long-term. It happens that we have two
sets of capital gains taxes, those on short-term gains, at ordinary
income tax rates, and those on long-term gains, at lower rates. The
6. See note 3 supra.

7. Steger, Simulation and Tax Analysis: A Research Proposal, 14 NAT'L TAX J. 286
(1961).
8. H.R. Doc. No. 43, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); President's 1963 Tax Message,
Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1,

at23 (1963).
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separation is not actually so distinct because short-term gains and
losses are netted out and then added to net long-term gains or losses.
One does not literally apply one rate to the short-term gains and
another to the long-term gains.
The confusion in terminology arises from the fact that "capital
gains tax" is used by some to refer solely to the lower rate applicable
to long-term gains. Since it would be confusing to use the term
"capital gains tax" in both senses we adopt the Schedule D definition
and use it to cover both short-term and long-term gains. The higher
rates on short-term gains and the differential or lower rates applicable
on long-term gains will be distinguished when appropriate.
A failure to recognize this terminological distinction is at the basis
of some of the comments made by Richman. 9
Richman compares a situation in which there is a low tax on gains
with a situation in which all gains are taxed at ordinary income
rates. As between the two, the low rate would encourage more realization than the high rate. The important question, however, is
whether the present tax on capital gains, with all its provisions, discourages realization as compared with a lower or zero tax on capital
gains. Richman's answers are consistent with, and tend to confirm,
the answers obtained by the present writer. Richman, too, shows that
a lower tax tends to encourage realization. Richman errs only in
thinking that his analysis weakens or destroys the argument to which
he addresses himself.
Three possibilities would be: (1) a high rate throughout (like the
current income tax rate); (2) a low rate (like the present rates
applicable to long-term gains only); and (3) a zero rate. Richman
argues that realization is encouraged by (2) as compared with (1).
Our analysis shows that realization is discouraged by going from (3)
to a combination of (1) and (2). The two conclusions are consistent
with each other and tend to reinforce each other.
The prevailing situation is that we have (1) and (2) simultaneously, separated by a holding period. An investor can move from
(1) to (2) of his own volition, provided that he waits long enough.
Thus (2) as compared with hypothetical (1) encourages not merely
realization, as Richman argues, but also waiting in order to realize.
The investor is locked-in, thereby reducing supply and raising prices
when prices are already high. Richman's argument thus strengthens
the conclusion that the existing capital gains tax (which includes (1)
and (2) separated by a holding period) produces a lock-in effect.
9. Richman, Incentive Effects of Alternative Tax Treatments of Capital Gains, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTY-THnD ANNUAL CONFERENCE 597
(1960); Richman, supranote 2.
NATIONAL TAX ASS'N,
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B.

SLOPE OF THE DEMAND CURVE FOR SECURTIES

A question has been raised about the slope of the demand curves
for capital assets. The curves are taken as downward sloping to
the right. Richman claims that the demand curve for a given security
is horizontal.'0 Even in pure and perfect competition where the
demand for a given firm's product is taken as horizontal, the demand
for the product as a whole is generally taken as downward sloping
to the right. A horizontal demand curve requires the assumption that
the product involved represents only an insignificant part of the total
demand and that the other products are perfect substitutes, not
merely near perfect substitutes. A departure from these assumptions
gives us a downward sloping demand curve for the capital asset involved. A horizontal demand curve means that an unlimited amount of
the security in question will be taken off the market at the given price.
This belies all experience in the stock market, where even a few
hundred additional shares will generally result in some change in
the price.
Even if the demand curve for individual securities were horizontal,
the total demand and supply of securities would have the assumed
characteristics. The vertical axis would represent a price-index of
securities (like Dow Jones, Standard & Poor's, etc.) and the horizontal axis would represent the aggregate of securities. The result would
be as indicated in previous articles, i.e., higher prices when prices are
already high and lower prices when prices are already low. Whether
or not the demand curve for a single security is horizontal or downward-sloping would not affect this result (although, as indicated
above, a perfectly horizontal demand curve for individual securities
violates theory and practice).
C.

STIENGTH OF TIIE "CAPrrAL EFFECT" IN LocING-IN INVESTORS

The strength of the "capital effect' in locking-in investors has recently been brought into question by Holt and Shelton who have
computed the additional yield required to compensate for the loss of
capital resulting from payment of the tax." The "capital effect" of
the tax has been stated succinctly by James Riley:
You told about this fellow selling. What did he do with the money?
If he invested it he would then have to reinvest at a rate high enough to
10. Richman, supra note 2, at 402.
11. Holt & Shelton, The Implications of the Capital Gains Tax for Investment Decisions, 16 J. FIN. 559 (1961); Holt & Shelton, The Lock-in Effect of the Capital Gains
Tax, 15 NAT'L TAx J.337 (1962). Cf. Sprinkel & West, Effects of Capital Gains Taxes
on Investment Decisions, 35 J.Bus. U. Cm. 122 (1962).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[VorL. 16

make up for the capital gains tax to continue the same return, wouldn't he? 12

Any sale reduces the amount of capital available by the amount of
tax paid. Amount of capital at work is important for the dividends

earned and any prospective capital gain to be obtained. An earlier
sale reduces the amount available earlier; hence, there is less capital
working for the investor. The longer the investor can hold on to the
tax money, other things being equal, the better off he is. The government does not (as yet) charge him interest on the potential tax on
the paper gain.
The yield differential that is required to unlock a holding and in-

duce a switch from one security to another-for those investors who
are yield conscious-is demonstrated by Holt and Shelton as follows:
A numerical example will illustrate the point. Assume that a share of
stock was purchased for $10.00 and its value has risen (more than 6
months later) to $50.00. Further assume that, because of high income,
the investor is in the maximum capital gains tax bracket of 25 per cent.
Note that such a situation makes the penalty of incurring the capital gains
tax especially severe; not only is the tax rate maximum, but the stock has
shown an unusually large gain. Not many investments attain a capital appreciation of 400 per cent. Assume that the investor believes that in the
future this stock will, on the average, yield (including both capital gains
and dividend income) 4 per cent per annum after taxes. If any alternate
security can be found that is expected to yield over 5 per cent on the
average in the future, then the investor should not be deterred from
switching because of the capital gains tax. On his present stock he expects
to net annually 4 per cent X $50.00 or $2.00 per share. If he switches to
another stock, he will incur a capital gains tax of $10.00 (25 per cent X
$40.00 capital gain), which will leave him $40.00 per share to invest in
the alternative stock. If this yields over 5 per cent, it will give the investor
more net income than the $2.00 that he expects to receive annually from
continuing to hold his original stock. Thus in this extreme case a yield
differential in favor of the alternate stock of 1 per cent would be enough,
as far as current income is concerned, to offset the capital gains tax.13

In this case, as the authors note, "a yield differential in favor of the
alternate stock of 1 per cent would be enough."

The yield effect of the capital gains tax as worked out by Holt and
Shelton is subject to one important limitation which they themselves
recognize. The authors state, "To isolate the influence of the capital

gains tax, it is assumed that shifts are considered between securities
of comparable risk."' 4 They add in a footnote, "The suppression of
risk considerations is a limitation of the following analysis. Much
12. Question by James Riley (New York) addressed to Richman during his presentation, Incentive Effects of Alternative Tax Treatments of Capital Gain, NATIONAL TAX
AsS'N, PnocFnminrs or FirrY-TmD AINcuAX. CONFERENCE 604 (1960).

13. Holt & Shelton, supra note 11, at 567.
14. Id. at 565-66.
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more work on this problem is needed." 5 Since risk considerations are
ignored, "comparable risk" is actually "equal risk." This is of the
greatest importance in assessing the significance of the "small" differences in yield that the authors find sufficient to unlock a holding.
It must be remembered that the yield differential of 1 per cent found
in the above example is between two securities of equal risk.
The comparison of yield differentials required to unlock a security
requires a computation of the yield on the full value compared with
the yield on the full value net of tax. In the numerical example above
the full value is $50 and the net value is $40. The yield obtainable
on these respective amounts in the presently held security and in the
alternative security, respectively, is what is relevant. If, instead of
making a yield comparison, we are trying to decide how much of a
price risk we can afford to run by holding, 16 the computation is as a
percentage of the gain alone, since it is a percentage of the gain that
we preserve by holding out (or holding on) for a lower tax rate.
As to the significance of the yield differentials required to induce
switching, Holt and Shelton say:
Thus far in this paper it has been shown that, unless the investor con-

templates avoiding the capital gains tax by dying or giving away the stock
or incurring a capital loss, he only postpones the capital gains tax by
choosing to remain "locked in" securities he holds. The advantage of post-

poning the tax can be calculated, and the investor can determine how much

greater the yield must be from some alternative investment to justify switching. Although precise data are unavailable, it would appear that for most

investors the yield differential that is necessary to justify switching is
smaller than the uncertainty that attaches to forecasts of future yields of

securities and often is smaller than the yield differentials that are forecast
between alternate securities.' 7

In the latter part of this statement, the authors make a factual statement of actual yield differentials as they prevail in the market. The
prevailing yield differentials, however, partly reflect differences in
risk. These the authors have ruled out by assumption. Yet prevailing differences in risk must surely explain a large part of existing
yield differentials that exist in the market. How often would we
expect to find a yield differential of as much as 1 per cent between
the two securities of equal risk?
D. SOCIAL

CONSEQUENCES OF THE

LocK-IN EFFECr

It has been suggested that the lock-in does not mean that money
is tied up in a particular stock. The argument is that the stock may
15. Id. at 566.
16. As is done in the next main part of this paper.
17. Holt & Shelton, supra note 11, at 570.
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be used for collateral.18 Since it is not possible to borrow 100 per
cent of the value of a stock there is some money tied up by virtue of
the fact that the full value is not available. Moreover, the interest
and arranging cost generally exceeds the return available. For instance, a broker may charge 6 per cent even though none of the
securities involved might yield that rate. The net effect of all this is
that a security unsold means that an investor's money is tied up at
least in part; and to the extent that it is tied up he cannot use it for
alternative investments. This encourages misallocation of resources.
E. EFFECT OF REALIZATION ON CONSUMPTION

The above analysis dealt with investors who wished to preserve
either their capital or their returns from capital. It is true that either
realized or unrealized capital gains may also encourage consumption. 9
A related example would be the liquidation of savings bonds
purchased under duress in war time.2 It has been suggested that
"the intended 'investment" of the purchaser of the security or asset
may be diverted into consumption, converting savings into consumption, hardly desirable from the standpoint of economic growth."' 1
Whether or not consumption contributes to economic growth is by
no means a closed subject for the American economy. Where
growth is retarded by a shortage of demand, including consumer
demand, an augmentation of consumer demand may well contribute
to growth.22 Apart from this, welfare maximization may be interfered
with by an arbitrary tax barrier (without other redeeming or welfaremaximizing features) which prevents free consumer choice as between saving and consumption. If the capital gains tax were designed
to discourage realization in order to achieve some higher purpose the
tax could be considered on its merits as a means to accomplish that
end. The economic repercussions of the lock-in are, however, as far
as the author knows, an unintended and accidental consequence.
Hence the tax provides an unintended and arbitrary barrier to welfare
maximization and optimum allocation of resources.

It is even questionable whether a rational consumer would give
18. Richman, supra note 2, at 403. With respect to the cost of borrowing, it may be
noted that in the week ending June 1, 1963 the average dividend yield of 500 common
stocks was 3.15%. Even prime commercial paper yielded more than this, 3.25%. (Federal Reserve Bulletin, June 1963, at 818.) Bank rates on short-term business loans for
the quarter ending in March 1963 averaged 5.00% in nineteen large cities. Id. at 817).
19. Ibid.
20. Statement of Harold M. Somers, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fiscal Policy
of the Joint Economic Comm., 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 198 (1957).
21. Richman, supra note 2, at 403.
22. See Stigler, Policies for Growth, in a Symposium on Economic Growth in Am.
BANxns' Ass'N, Pnoc. 110 (1963).

1963]

CAPITAL GAINS TAX

up the advantage of waiting for the long-term rate. Surely ordinary
time preference would urge a consumer-disinvestor to wait a few
months in order to take advantage of the lower rate and have much
more available for consumption. If consumption is the motive, there
would have to be a very high rate of time preference to warrant sale
now at ordinary rates rather than sale later at long-term rates. The
actual rate of time preference required would vary with the tax
bracket of the individual and the length of time that would have to
elapse before he could enjoy the larger consumption. Suppose a basis
of $100, a sale price of $200, and rates of 50 per cent and 25 per cent
respectively, with three months to elapse until the lower rate sets in.
The tax now would be $50 and the tax in three months would be
$25. The consumption now could be $150 and in three months $175.
Thus a decision to consume now would imply a rate of time preference of 16.6 + per cent (25/150) for three months or 66.67 per cent
per annum even without compounding! It is evident that a consumerdisinvestor would especially lock himself in. Even in case of a consumption emergency it would generally pay him to borrow to the
end of the holding period rather than liquidate. As mentioned
previously, it would generally not be possible to obtain a loan for the
full value of the securities if the latter were used as collateral. Consumers are not limited to collateral loans, however, if they are willing
to pay high enough interest rates.
The fact that going rates of interest are not of this order of magnitude suggests that such high rates of time preference do not exist, or
at any rate, could not persist for long. There is a tendency toward an
equalization of the marginal rate of time preference (marginal rate
of return on consumption) and the market rate of interest.2 It is not
likely that a marginal rate of time preference of 66 per cent per annum
would exist for long beside a market rate of interest for secured loans
of, say, 6 per cent. There would be a tremendous demand for consumer loans. The market rate of interest would be forced up and the
marginal rate of time preference would be forced down until equality
was achieved or approached. In short, even consumers would prefer
remaining locked-in to suffering the high cost of consuming now
rather than a few months hence.
III. SGNIFICANCE OF A REDUCriON IN LONG-TERM BATE
The effects of the holding period and the long-term rate are closely
bound together. We cannot estimate the incentive effects of a change
in the holding period unless we know how strong is the inducement
23. As well as other marginal rates of return. See Somers, Monetary Policy and the
Theory of Interest, 55 Q. J. EcoN. 488 (1941).
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to hold to the end of the period. We must therefore first consider
the effects of the lower long-term rate and of changes in that rate.
A. PcE RisKs INDUCED

BY

=HE LONG-TERM RATE

Shelton has directed his attention to those purchasers of stocks who
are interested in obtaining a capital gain rather than income and are
considering the possibility of waiting for the long-term rate.24 He has
dealt with the situation where a sale is desirable even at full income
tax rates. The question is then whether the investor should hold until
the six-month period is past. This isolates the effect of the lower longterm rate; the sale would take place immediately if there were no
differential rate after six months. The problem is to determine under
what circumstances the tax saving would induce a holding past the
six months.
The problem, as always, is one of expectations concerning the
particular security held compared with expectations concerning
alternatives. If expectation (at moment of contemplated sale) is that
the market will drop, tax consequences cannot be ignored. A sale
before the end of the holding period will result in a larger tax bite
than a sale after the end of the holding period, with corresponding
(opposite) effects on the net cash position. Thus the extent of the
anticipated drop must be considered before a decision can be taken
as to whether or not to sell and go into cash. Moreover, it must be
remembered that any new securities purchased with the cash will be
at a lower base (hence ultimately higher tax). In short, the decision
becomes a complicated one and tax implications cannot be ignored
where a drop in the stock market is anticipated. The differential tax
may in some cases then make the difference between selling or not.
As Shelton points out, it is very easy to fall into several forms of
specious reasoning in trying to decide whether to sell now or wait
until the six-month holding period is past. One type of error is to
assume that a price drop equivalent to the tax to be paid now may
be risked by waiting. It would be a mistake to risk a drop equal to
the full amount of tax. The reason is that some tax will still have to
be paid after the six months even if the price drops that much. This
error exaggerates somewhat the lock-in inducement of the tax. There
is a strong lock-in inducement but not quite so strong as this.
The opposite error is committed by the investor who thinks he can
risk a price drop equivalent only to one-half the short-term tax. He
forgets that a lower price would result in a smaller amount of tax.
An investor who makes this error would be tempted to sell pre24. Shelton, Influence of the Six-Month Capital Gains Rule on Short Term Transactions, Fin. Analysts

J., Sept.-Oct.

1962.
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maturely. He should feel locked-in more than he does. He can afford
a greater price risk than he thinks.

The investor can determine the correct amount of price risk by
trial and error or by an algebraic solution which takes account of the

fact that any drop in price reduces the tax liability (thus avoiding
the mistake made by the second investor) but may still leave some

liability (thus avoiding the mistake made by the first investor). In
short, the investor should lock himself in by precisely the right
amount, neither more nor less. The key is the expectation of the
investor as to the price after the short-term period has passed. If he
expects the price to be the same as now or higher, unquestionably
he should wait. If he expects the price to be lower, the question
whether or not he should wait hinges on how much lower he expects

the price to be.
Shelton has worked out the maximum price drop for investors in
various tax brackets as follows:
If the Investor's marginal
tax rate (i.e., the ratio of
extra tax to extra income) is:

He can afford to lose the following
percentage of his current gain and
still be as well off if he sells after
holding six months instead of selling earlier:

20.0% ..................................................................................
11.1%
22.2% ..................................................................................
12.5%
25.0% ..................................................................................
14 .3%
28.5% ..................................................................................
16.7%
30.0% ..................................................................................
17.6%
33.3% ..................................................................................
20.0%
35.0% ............
.
......................... 21.2%
37.5% ..................................................................................
23.6%
40.0% ..................................................................................
25.0%
42.0% ..................................................................................
26.6%
44.0% ..................................................................................
28.2%
46.0% ..................................................................................
29.9%
48.0% ..................................................................................
31.6%
50.0% ..................................................................................
33.3%
55.0% ..................................................................................
40.0%
60.0% ..................................................................................
46.7%
62.5% ..................................................................................
50.0%
65.0% ..................................................................................
53.3%
70.0% ..................................................................................
60.0%
75.0% ..................................................................................
66.7%
Illustrative example, based on the text: Assume an investor in a 50%
marginal tax bracket has $12,000 short-term paper profit. How much
of the profit can he afford to lose and still be as well off, after taxes,
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if he holds till six months have elapsed? Answer from the table: 33.3%
or $4,000.25

It should be noted that the price drop is (necessarily) expressed as
a percentage of the paper gain rather than as a percentage of the full
price.
Shelton has developed a formula to compute the price risk. The
fraction of drop in gain that may be risked is
Gn- GL
Gn

-

GL
Gn

(
Rn)
(1- RL)

where Gn is the paper gain now existing; GL is the estimated gain
if the asset is held to the end of the holding period; Rn is the tax
rate on existing gains; and RL is the rate on long-term gains (or any
lower rate) 26
Shelton's conclusion as to the strength of the lock-in effect is as
follows:
Consideration of the table suggests that there is strong reason to be

locked-in to securities with a short term profit until the six months holding
period has passed. Most investors cannot predict changes in stock prices

over a short period of time; and so it would take a clear presumption of a
price slump to justify the expectation of a 20% or 30% shrinkage in gain

over a few months.2 7

It should be noted that Shelton says there is "strong reason to be
locked-in" under the circumstances given.
0

B.

COMPARISON OF PRESENT AND PRoPosW

LONG-TERM RATES

A reduction in the long-term rate will alter the computations
as to the desirability of remaining locked-in during the holding
period. The President's proposal is to remove the maximum rate but
include only 30 per cent of long-term gains. Using the formula given
above, we develop the following comparison:
25. Ibid.
26. Thus if a person is in the 40% bracket, hence 20% long-term, the percentage
(1 - .40)

1 - (1 - .20)
- .25, or 25%. If he is in
drop that he can afford to risk is
the 70% bracket (hence, 25% long-term under the existing limitation) the figure is

(1

-

.7o)

1 - (I-- .0)

.60,

or 60%.

- .2 ) supra
p n
97.(2Shelton,
note 24.
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Investor's Marginal
Income Tax Rate
(Hypothetical Rates)

Percentage of Current Gain That May
Be Risked by Holding for Long-Term Rate

Under Present Rules
(50% includible and

Under Proposed Rules
(30% includible and

maximum tax rate of

no maximum rate)

25%)
14%
20%
25%
30%

7.5%
11.1%
14.3%
17.6%

40%

10.2%
14.9%
18.9%
23.1%

25.0%

31.8%

50%
65%
75%
80%
83.3%
87%
91%

33.3%
53.3%
66.7%
73.3%
77.7%
82.7%
88.0%

41.2%
56.5%
67.8%
73.7%
77.7%
82.4%
87.6%

Various income tax rates are illustrated in the above schedule, some
indicative of the existing schedule and some indicative of the proposed schedule. A rough estimate of the results for any rates not
illustrated may be obtained by interpolation; an exact estimate may
be obtained by use of the formula. The rate of 87 per cent (often
overlooked) is included since it is the overall limitation under the
existing schedule (hence might better be placed after the 91 per
cent rate). A person whose income is subject to the overall limitation is for all practical purposes faced with an 87 per cent rate for
any additional income.
It is evident that the capital effect would be increased by the
proposed capital gains tax provision and the proposed income tax
schedule ranging from 14 per cent to 65 per cent. Even under the
old income tax schedule ranging from 20 per cent to 91 per cent, the
proposed capital gains tax provision (i.e., 30 per cent inclusion)
would increase the capital effect for all taxpayers except those at
approximately an 83.3 per cent bracket (if there were such) or
higher. This point is determined by the application of the 30 per
cent inclusion to the 83.3 per cent "bracket," giving us an effective tax
of 25 per cent on the long-term gains. Investors currently below the
hypothetical 83.3 per cent bracket would pay less under the proposed
plan, hence would have a greater lock-in inducement. Those above
the 83.3 per cent bracket would pay more than 25 per cent on longterm gains under the proposed capital gains tax provisions. It is
virtually certain, however, that a limitation of 25 per cent or less
would be adopted for these persons in the unlikely eventually that the
old income tax rate schedule is allowed to stand but the proposed
capital gains plan is adopted in toto.
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We may now speculate on what would happen if the long-term
rate were reduced (assuming no change in the holding period).
Looking at the problem first only from the supply side, we may
separate those who are in the short-term period and those who are
in the long-term period. Those in the long-term period who currently
remained locked-in by the capital effect of the tax would find an
inducement to sell. A reduction in the long-term rate from 25 per
cent to 19.5 per cent, for instance, would represent a significant reduction in the tax. This is likely to have an effect in the direction of
unlocking some of those who had been locked-in even by the old
long-term tax.
Those who are in the short-term period, however, would have a
greater inducement than ever to wait until the end of the holding
period in order to enjoy the lower long-term rate. They could
afford to risk a greater price drop in order to enjoy the lower
rate. They would have a tendency to feel a greater lock-in inducement than before the reduction in long-term rate. (If all tax
rates are reduced, both short-term and long-term, as in the President's
proposal, some short-term holders who were locked-in by the capital
effect of the ordinary income tax might be induced to sell under the
lower rates on ordinary income.)
The net effect of the two opposing forces on supply would depend
on the relative importance of the respective groups of holders at any
time. It should be pointed out that we are not here dealing only with
those who now sell but also with those who hold and do not sell at
present rates. Studies of transactions of professional floor traders
active on the New York Stock Exchange show that 90 per cent of
their sales (long as opposed to short sales) in a sample period consisted of stock which had been purchased within the preceding
month.2 The sales that actually occurred under the existing taxes do
not give us all the data we need for the present purpose. We are
interested in two figures: (1) the sales that did not occur under
existing rates and would occur if the rates were reduced a specified
amount; and (2) the sales that did occur under existing rates and
would not have occurred if the lower rates had prevailed. These
statistics would be highly useful to our study but are unfortunately
not available. We are therefore not in a position to weigh statistically
the relative importance of short-term holders who are newly locked-in
by a lower long-term rate and long-term holders who are unlocked by
the rate.
As the newly locked-in short-term holdings mature into long-term
holdings they will come onto the market. Thus insofar as the lower
28. Statement of G. Keith Funston, Hearings Before the House Ways and Means
Comm., 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 1411 (1963).
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tax discourages short-term sales it will increase the volume of longterm sales after the initial period. For every short-term sale that does
not take place there will be a long-term sale which represents waiting
by a seller who has held into the long-term period in order to enjoy
the lower rate. The volume of transactions and the liquidity of the
market will be reduced, however, in that the holder might have
been in and out of the market several times in the interval.
IV.

SIGNIFICANCE OF CHANGES IN THE HOLDING PERIOD

We may now turn to the consequences of changes in the holding
period. One possibility is a simple change in the length of the period,
such as shortening to three months or a lengthening to one year.
Another possibility is to have multiple holding periods with a corresponding structure of rates, such as existed from 1934 through 1941.
Of course, another possibility is a complete elimination of the
holding period, which would mean that the lower rates (whatever
they may be) would apply on any capital gains regardless of the
length of time involved. At the other extreme, low rates might set in
after only three, five, or ten years, or more.
A. STATISTICS ON EXISTING HOLDING PMUODS

The Treasury Department has made a study of capital gains reported on income tax returns in 1959. It shows that the average shortterm holding on returns reporting short-term sales was 3.2 months and
the average long-term holding was slightly over 4 years.29 The returns showing long-term sales indicated holdings spread fairly evenly
from the seventh to twelfth months; there was no bunching in the
seventh month.30
One might be tempted to draw the inference that bunching of
sales in the seventh month would be logical if the holding period
were important. This inference is invalid. Even if the lower longterm rate were the sole reason for holding during the holding period,.
no bunching would be expected. The reason for this is that when the
holding period is over and the investor has reached low-rate territory,.
he would and should make a decision de novo whether and when to
sell, based on the prospects at that time. It would be the height of
folly to stick slavishly to a forecast made as much as six months before. An investor should reassess his situation every time he has an
opportunity to do so. Unless he makes a binding contract (and even
29..Sales of Capital Assets Reported on Individual Income Tax Returns for 1959,.
in INTEnNAL REVENUE SERVICE, STATISTICS OF INCOME 1959 (Supp. Report, p. 1).

30. Id. at 12.
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then there may be a legitimate escape clause with penalty attached)
he would be foolish to impose any self-made restriction on his actions.
An investor who is locked-in on account of a tax is locked-in
because it is in his interests to be locked-in, given the tax, i.e., because he wants to be locked-in, considering all relevant facts and
circumstances. Thus a bunching in the seventh month is exactly what
one would not expect from an investor who allowed himself to be
locked-in to the end of the six-month period by the lower long-term
rate. He will enjoy the lower rate anytime after the six months, not
in the seventh month alone. Having once arrived in long-term rate
territory, any date of realization is as good as another tax-wise except
for two things: (1) timing in relation to other gains and losses for
offset purposes; and (2) the continuing prospect of exemption by
gift or death. Both these tax factors react against a tax-induced
bunching in the seventh month or any other particular point of time.
In addition, of course, price expectations may have changed completely.
In short, a person who has held a stock for more than six months
may have done so for a variety of reasons. One of these reasons is
the lower long-term tax that prevails. Once he has held the stock
long enough to enjoy the lower long-term rate, whatever may have
been his original motivation, he will sell whenever it is in his best
interests to sell. There is no reason whatever to assume that the
seventh month is preferable to any other month from that point of
view. The non-bunching of sales at the end of the six-month period
is consistent with the hypothesis that tax considerations originally
induced the holding during the period.
B.

FAcToRs RELEVANT TO THE LENGTH OF THE HOLDING PERIOD

An extension of the holding period to one year would not change
the price-risk analysis [of Part III] in its simple form. The amount
of price-risk that may be taken does not depend on the length of the
holding period. Returning to the formula where GR is the percentage
of paper gain that may be risked, we have
GR

Gn- GL
Gn

(1 - Rn)
(1 - RL)

The length of the holding period does not enter into this formula at
all, and thus plays no part in the outcome, on this simple basis. The
lower tax rate for long-term holdings provides an inducement to hold
regardless of the length of the holding period.
In a more complete analysis the length of the holding period does
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play a part. The following are relevant considerations peculiar to
the length of the holding period itself.
1. The Forecasting-ErrorFactor.-The longer the holding period,
the longer the time over which the chance must be taken on the
price that will prevail when the holding period is ended. It is conceivable that it will be easier to forecast prices a year from now than
a half-year from now. If such is the case, there is nothing to stop an
investor under a six-month holding period from acting as if he were
on a one-year holding period. In such a case the six-month period
is advantageous since the plan can readily be revised, if necessary,
after the six-month period has passed.
If it is more difficult to forecast for the longer period than for the
shorter period, the longer period imposes a cost on the investor in
the form of greater uncertainty with no greater expectation of reward. There is presumably some price-equivalent for the greater
uncertainty for the particular investor. This price-equivalent will
vary from investor to investor. An investor may expect a price of
eighty at the end of both a six-month period and a one-year period.
This may be his focus expectation or the mean expected value. (We
need not here go into the various theories of expectations except to
use only those that come up with a single operational figure.) Since
greater uncertainty attaches to the longer-term expectation, he is not
indifferent between them (leaving aside the interest factor for the
moment). Some higher focus or mean expectation of price for the
longer term would be required for the investor to be indifferent
between the two. The greater the time lapse, the greater the uncertainty (we assume) and the greater the price-equivalent required.
(We ignore those who love uncertainty for its own sake.)
We may refer to this as the "forecasting-error" involved in holding
to the end of the holding period. We are assuming here that the
forecasting-error is a direct function of time and that an increased
forecasting risk discourages taking the risk; hence, a longer holdingperiod would, in itself, discourage the holding.
The conclusion from this part of the analysis is that one aspect of
a longer holding period would be a tendency to reduce the lock-in
effect. Investors would say, in effect, "There's so much uncertainty
involved in waiting the longer period that I may as well sell now and
pay the full tax." In other words, the forecasting-error factor works
for a reduced lock-in effect.
2. The Interest Factor.-The longer the period of tax avoidance,
the longer the time the investor has use of the tax money. This stems
from the capital effect, which means that if the investor sells now
and pays the tax now he no longer has the use of the tax money. If
he holds, he has the full amount of capital working for him until he
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does sell. This factor speaks for increasing the lock-in effect, since
there is an interest benefit in holding. The investor can afford to risk
a lower price in the future in view of the interest he earns by holding.
If he holds for a year rather than a half-year he will have the use of
the implicit tax money longer.
This effect is mitigated somewhat by the fact that the tax is not
paid immediately at the moment of sale. With tax returns due on
April 15 of the following year, the seller might have use of the tax
money as much as fifteen and a half months after sale. The requirement of income estimation and quarterly payment tends to reduce
the length of this period. The variety of procedures for income estimation and the leeway permitted, in turn, reduce the significance of
the payment requirement. Whenever he does pay the tax, the investor
loses the use of the money involved.
The interest factor may seem to be irrelevant: there is nothing
to stop a person from holding for one year even under a six-month
holding period. An investor who wants to benefit from the interest
factor is at liberty to do so. No matter when an investor sells, he
suffers some loss of capital from the tax. Even after he gets into
long-term rate territory, the capital effect and resulting interest factor
provide an inducement to hold on. The fact that one can voluntarily
subject himself to a longer holding does not, however, negate the fact
that in any contemplated holding the interest benefit must be offset
against any costs or risks involved.
3. The Conflict of These Factors.-Thus we have two conflicting
tendencies arising from the lengthening of the holding period (keeping tax rates constant). The longer time increases the forecastingerror involved, hence weakens the lock-in effect; the longer time also
increases the interest gained by waiting, hence strengthens the lockin effect. Whatever lock-in effect there was on account of the existing holding period would thus be subject to these conflicting forces
in case of a lengthening of the holding period.
What is the relative strength of these two conflicting forces? The
interest cost is determined by market forces outside the individual
investor. Each investor could learn from his banker the rate he would
have to pay to give him the capital he needed to substitute for the
tax he would pay if he sold now. The forecasting-error factor is more
subjective, and depends on his evaluation of the risks, basing his
evaluation on such objective data as he can muster. An additional
wait of six months might completely dissuade some investors who had
been willing to wait until the end of a six-month holding period.
4. Comparison With the Tax Rate Effect.-In summary, there are
three effects working on the investor as a result of the lower-tax rate
prevalent after a given holding period: the tax rate effect, the fore-

1963]

CAPITAL GAINS TAX

casting-erroreffect and the interest effect. The tax-rate effect creates
a clear and unquestionable lock-in effect which is independent of the
length of the holding period. The forecasting-error and interest
effects are opposite functions of the length of the holding period. The
somewhat surprising conclusion from all this is that the tax rate
differential is important but the length of the holding period is, on
the balance, either conjectural, indeterminate or unimportant in
determining the strength of the inducement to remain locked-in.
The above discussion indicates simply that the lengthening of the
holding period may not affect the inducement to hold, i.e., the
inducement to remain locked-in. The actual lock-in effect during the
holding period stems primarily from the tax rate differential, regardless of the length of the holding period (within the range under
consideration).
This does not mean that a lengthening of the holding period would
be without market significance. On the contrary, the effects would
be profound. If the inducement to remain locked-in is unchanged, it
follows that roughly the same number of investors who are now
locked-in until the end of the six-month period are likely to remain
locked-in until the end of the one-year period. The composition of
the investors involved will undoubtedly change and the amounts involved may not be quite the same. The rough magnitudes are, however, likely to be about the same. Those who remain locked-in will
be locked-in longer than before. Under the six-month holding period,
the average length of tax-inspired lock-in may be taken as three
months. Under a one-year holding period the average may be taken
as six months. (Such holding as occurs after the holding period has
passed is inspired by other than the differential long-term rate.) As
indicated above, we are assuming that the conflicting forces that
operate on the inducement to hold offset each other. The longer holding period thus increases the weighted effect of the lock-in inducement. The result must be an aggravation of the economic consequences previously indicated for the existing provisions, namely,
promotion of cyclical instability and retardation of economic growth.
There is also a decrease in volume of transactions. This occurs in
two ways: (1) while he is locked-in the investor does not sell; and
(2) not having sold, he may also fail to buy once or several times
within the period. This reduced volume of transactions means a reduction in the liquidity of the market. Markets become thinner and
securities less attractive in their liquidity aspect, i.e., the readiness
and sureness with which they can be turned into cash. This has the
effect of making new financing more difficult or more costly or both.
This must retard economic growth.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This paper has been concerned with the significance of proposed
changes in holding period and long-term rate under the capital gains
tax. The two are closely intertwined; whether it pays to hold for a
particular length of time depends partly on the rate that will apply
at the end of the holding period. For this reason, a full discussion of
the significance of long-term rates is a prerequisite to a consideration
of the effects of changes in the holding period. Basic to all this is an
understanding of the way in which the capital gains tax (whether the
detailed rates and period are modified or not) creates a lock-in effect

and contributes to price instability, reduces the liquidity of the market
and impairs economic growth.
Since the purchase of physical assets, such as plant and equipment,
generally involves the issuance of securities of one sort or another at
some time, the impact of the tax on the purchaser of securities may
directly affect the ease and cost of making the physical investment.
The effect looks beyond the time when the securities are sold and the
initial financing is completed. The ease with which a holder of a
security can subsequently sell it is one of the considerations that is
taken into account in the initial purchase. The prospect of a "thin"
market in a security tends to have a discouraging effect whereas the
prospect of a large volume of transactions in a security, hence a
highly liquid market, tends to have an encouraging effect.
It can be demonstrated that the capital gains tax tends to curtail
the volume of transactions and reduce the liquidity of the market
through the lock-in that it induces. Doubts that have been raised as
to the significance of the lock-in effect do not stand up to close
scrutiny. In particular, the fact that securities are substitutes for one
another does not reduce the impact of the tax on the securities
market as a whole. The fact that an investor might borrow on a
security he holds in order to invest in another is not significant since
the borrowing is generally at less than full value and the rates are
generally higher than the yield on the securities. The argument that
someone has the money to invest, even if the locked-in investor does
not, fails to take account of the fact that an investor who is locked-in
by the tax is prevented or discouraged from switching to another
investment; hence the mobility of capital is curtailed, the optimum
allocation of resources is interfered with, and economic growth is
dampened. The possibility that an investor might want to liquidate
for purposes of consumption is of little consequence; he would have
to be terribly hungry to lose the great benefit conferred on him by
waiting a few months to the end of the holding period.
The benefit of waiting to the end of the holding period is large
and measurable; the proposed changes in rates would increase the
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benefit. When expressed in terms of yields, it might appear that only

a small yield differential would induce an investor to switch immediately instead of waiting until the end of the holding period. By
virtue of the same substitutability as was mentioned above, however,
it is not likely that significant yield differentials exist at any time
between securities of equal risk. Hence, even a yield-conscious investor would find the lower long-term rate a strong inducement to

hold to the end of the holding period.
A lengthening of the holding period would set conflicting forces in

motion. Some long-term investors might "give up" and decide not
to wait for the end of the longer period-the greater price risk involved in waiting longer is too much for them. On the other hand,

the longer the period involved the longer the period during which the
investor keeps his full capital working for him, unimpaired by tax.
We assume that the inducement to hold is not likely to be affected
materially on balance. Any net effect either way is likely to be
small compared with the fact that a substantial period is added onto
the lock-in period of those who decide to wait for the long-term rate.

The result of a lengthening of the holding period would thus be an
increase in the lock-in effect on the market and a reduction in the

volume of transactions and in the liquidity of the market. The increased lock-in itself would tend to accentuate price instability and

retard economic growth; and the reduced liquidity would reduce the
attractiveness of securities, hence increasing the difficulty and raising
the cost of financing, with further detrimental effects on economic

growth. 31

31. On May 28, 1963, the Committee on Ways and Means of the U.S. House of
Representatives released a statement which included the following paragraph:
Under the tentative decision of the Committee, a taxpayer would include 30
percent (instead of 50 percent as under present law) of net long-term gains in
excess of net short-term losses in his ordinary income tax base in the case of
certain long-term capital gains where the asset has been held for three years or
more. However, this 30-percent inclusion factor will only apply to gains which may
be classified as "true" capital gains, the exact definition of which the Committee
will subsequently decide upon. These capital gains will be subject to a maximum
tax rate of 19.5 percent. The 50-percent inclusion factor and the 25 percent
maximum tax rate of existing law will continue to apply in the case of assets held
for more than six months and less than three years.
The proposed three-year rule would provide an additional tax benefit and would not
supplant the existing six-month provision. The result would be to make securities,
including new securities, more attractive to prospective buyers. The three-year period
is long enough to make the "forecasting-error factor," discussed above, quite powerful.
The likelihood that many investors will be newly locked-in by the three-year provision
is not great. The reward for holding a full three years is a maximum rate of 19.5%, as
opposed to a maximum rate of 25% for holding six months. Hence, prospective sellers
of existing securities are not likely to be inhibited greatly, if at all, by the three-year
provision. The net effect on demand and supply combined is thus likely to be favorable
to liquidity and growth.

